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This paper uses a social experiment in labour market policy – providing early and intensive 
monitoring and programme participation in unemployment spells – to assess the nature of 
labour market policy effectiveness. The experiment was conducted in two counties in 
Denmark during the winter of 2005-6. The treatment consisted of a dramatic intensification of 
labour market policies. The results show that the intensification of labour market policies is 
highly effective, leading to increases in the exit rate from unemployment ranging from 20 to 
40%. When introducing time-varying indicators for the various specific treatments actually 
prescribed to the unemployed workers, none of those treatments have a positive effect on the 
exit rate from unemployment, neither during the week in which the activity takes place, nor 
after the activity is completed. However, when the estimated risk of participating in an activity 
is included as an explanatory variable, it removes the difference in job-finding rates between 
treatment and control groups completely in one of the counties, and reduces it dramatically 
and renders it insignificant in the other county. The interpretation we attach to these results is 
the following; since individual treatments do not appear to be effective per se, but the risk of 
treatment is, it must be that the intensification of the policy regime increases the job-finding 
rate of unemployed workers. 
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This paper exploits evidence from a social experiment - providing early and
intensive monitoring and active labour market programme participation to
unemployed workers - to derive some lessons regarding the nature of labour
market policy eﬀectiveness in general and the perceived success of the Danish
labour market model in particular.
Recently, the Danish model of the labour market has received much at-
tention in the rest of Europe, because of its perceived eﬀectiveness in main-
taining high participation rates and low unemployment rates. This successful
performance is often attributed to the highly praised ’Flexicurity’ model. Ba-
sically, the Flexicurity model consists of three components; 1) ﬂexible hiring
and ﬁring rules and regulations, 2) a generous unemployment insurance and
unemployment assistance system, and 3) a very active labour market policy
ensuring the availability and the qualiﬁcational level of the work force.
In the 1980s, when unemployment rates were persistently high, the ﬁrst
two components of the Flexicurity model - ﬂexibility and security - were
already in operation in the Danish labour market, but the active labour
market policy was only in its infant stages and not nearly as intensive as it
has become today. Therefore, many have seen intensive active labour market
policies as a pivotal component in the model. However, most researchers
would agree that, in general, the direct eﬀects on earnings and employment
at the level of the individual participant in active labour market programmes
are negligible (and in some cases even negative), and this is also the case in
Denmark. Hence, it is this apparently paradoxical situation which we intend
to shed light on in this paper.
The reform that began the intensiﬁcation of the active labour market
policies was introduced in 1994, and since then it has been gradually inten-
siﬁed until 2003, when it was loosened again in some dimensions, while it
was tightened in others. For example, until 2003 it had been the case that
individuals who had been unemployed for one year should participate in ac-
tive labour market programmes (ALMP) for at least 80% of their remaining
time in unemployment. This was called the ’active period’, and it was criti-
cized for becoming a ’programme factory’, where participants were assigned
to programmes not on the basis of need, but because of the rules. However,
this ’active period’ has been shown to be indirectly quite eﬀective because
of the so-called threat eﬀect of ALMPs, see e.g. Rosholm & Svarer (2008),
Geerdsen (2006), and Geerdsen & Holm (2007). Namely, the programmes
were not eﬀective in themselves, on the contrary, but the perceived threat
of having to participate continuously in ALMPs led unemployed workers to
leave the unemployment queue before entering the ’active period’. The threat
2eﬀect has also been documented by other researchers, most notably by Black
et al. (2003), but also by e.g. Hägglund (2006).
This observation points to the more general observation made above re-
garding the eﬀectiveness of active labour market policies; despite the varia-
tion in the implementation of them throughout the world, and despite their
verbalized eﬀectiveness and political popularity in e.g. the Danish Flexicu-
rity model, econometricians have generally failed to estimate large positive
employment or earnings eﬀects. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence
that programme eﬀects are small and in some cases even negative, see e.g.
Heckman et al. (1999), Kluve & Schmidt (2002) and Kluve (2006). Could it
be, then, that the virtues of such programmes should be sought elsewhere?
The presence of the threat eﬀect suggests that programme participation -
and possibly active labour market policies in general - acts as a ’tax’ on un-
employed individuals’ leisure time; by taxing away some of the unemployed
workers’ time, the marginal utility of spending time in unemployment falls,
and hence, unemployment spells are shortened due to increased search activ-
ities or lower reservation wages. The threat eﬀect materializes the moment
the individual realizes that there is a positive risk of having to participate in
a programme in the future, and when that risk becomes substantial, it may
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the search behaviour of the individual.
In this paper, we analyse a social experiment conducted in two counties in
Denmark during the winter of 2005-6. Speciﬁcally, all individuals in the two
counties who became unemployed during this period were randomized into
a treatment and a control group based on their birthday; those born on the
1st to the 15th were given the treatment, and those born on the 16th to the
31st were not. The treatment consisted of a dramatic intensiﬁcation of labour
market policies, involving information, very early mandatory participation in
job search assistance programmes, highly frequent meetings with employment
oﬃcers, and full-time programme participation for at least three months if
they had not found employment before 18 weeks of unemployment. Since the
treatment in part consists of giving the unemployed worker information about
the new labour market regime, treatment starts on the day the individual
receives that information. Inspection of survival functions can inform us
about the treatment eﬀect of the entire experiment, but if we want to know
more about the impacts of separate components in the experiment, a carefully
designed econometric analysis is required.
A duration model is the natural starting point for analysing this experi-
ment due to its dynamic nature, since, even if there is randomisation at the
time of the inﬂow into unemployment, there will be dynamic selection bias
from the day individuals are aware of the diﬀerent policy regimes adminis-
tered to the treatment and control groups. Correcting for dynamic selection
3bias is an intrinsic feature of the duration model, provided, of course, that
it is correctly speciﬁed. Therefore, we devote some attention to developing a
fairly ﬂexible empirical model. This implies estimating the model separately
for the two counties, since the intensiﬁcation of labour market policies is han-
dled quite diﬀerently by the labour market authorities in the two counties as
shown in section 5.
Preliminary results show that the intensiﬁcation of labour market policies
has a large impact, leading to increases in the exit rate from unemployment
ranging from 20 to 40%, varying by region and elapsed unemployment du-
ration. This implies a reduction in average unemployment duration of 2.2
weeks (approximately 15%) in both counties. These results are roughly the
same as those found by Graversen & van Ours (2008a, 2008b), who were the
ﬁr s tt ou s et h ed a t af r o mt h i se x p e r i m e n t .
This paper uses the results found by Graversen & van Ours (2008) as a
starting point, and the contributions of this study are the following: ﬁrst,
we provide more detail on the actual treatments administered to treatment
and control group members. Speciﬁcally, we include information on all pro-
grammes attended and all meetings held between the unemployed and their
case worker in the treatment as well as the control group. It turns out
that meetings are particularly important. Second, we conduct the analy-
sis separately for the two regions, something which is important, given the
diﬀerence in actual treatments administered in the two regions. Third, we
discuss in detail the concept of dynamic selection bias and the assumptions
under which more can be learnt from the data generated by the experiment.
Fourth, and most importantly, we estimate the risk of participating in an
activity (a meeting or a programme) in a given week and include this as an
explanatory variable in the equation for the hazard rate from unemployment
to employment, in addition to all the indicators of actually receiving some
treatment. Finally, we discuss in depth the implication of the results as well
as the lessons and policy implications that may be derived from them.
When controlling for treatment group status as well as time-varying in-
dicators for the various speciﬁc treatments actually prescribed to the unem-
ployed workers - job search assistance, meetings, programmes etc. - a highly
intriguing picture of labour market policy impacts emerges: None of the spe-
ciﬁct r e a t m e n t sh a v ep o s i t i v ee ﬀects, indeed, some of them have large neg-
ative lock-in eﬀects, and some even have large negative post-programme ef-
fects. When including the estimated ’risk-of-activation’ and ’risk-of-meetings’
variables, we ﬁnd that they have a strong positive eﬀect on the job-ﬁnding
rate, and for one of the counties they ’explain’ the entire diﬀerence in job-
ﬁnding rates between treatment and control groups. Moreover, it appears as
if the intensiﬁcation of the meeting frequency is much more important than
4the intensiﬁcation of programme participation rates.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; in the next section,
we provide a brief and selective survey of the literature on counseling &
monitoring and on threat eﬀects, and in section 3 the social experiment is
described. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on the data, and section 5
describes the realised treatments. In section 6, the methodological framework
used for the analysis is presented, and section 7 contains our main results and
some robustness checks. Finally, conclusions and policy lessons are derived
in section 8.
2 The Literature on Counseling & Monitor-
ing and Threat Eﬀects
Crepon et al. (2005) evaluate the eﬀects of intensive counseling schemes
administered to French unemployed workers. The aim of these schemes is to
improve the quality of assignment of workers to jobs. They ﬁnd that some
of these schemes signiﬁcantly reduce unemployment duration, and moreover
they ﬁnd that they all improve the match quality in the sense that the time
until unemployment recurrence is prolonged. Hence, they argue that it is
important to investigate the longer term programme eﬀects on employment
duration as well as unemployment duration.
Van den Berg & van der Klaauw (2006) estimate the eﬀect of counseling
and monitoring on the transition rate to employment. They use data from a
social experiment and ﬁnd no evidence that counseling and monitoring aﬀect
t h ee x i tr a t et ow o r k . M o r e o v e r ,t h e yﬁnd that increased monitoring leads
to a shift from informal to formal job search.
Cockx & Dejemeppe (2007) use a regression discontinuity design to esti-
mate the threat eﬀect of monitoring the search activity of the unemployed
in Belgium. They ﬁn dt h a tt h em o r ee m p l o y a b l ew o r k e r sr e a c tt ot h et h r e a t
of monitoring by ﬁnding employment faster. They also look at counseling
schemes and ﬁnd that counseling can have an impact on job-ﬁnding rates for
some workers.
Kjærsgaard et al. (2008) assume random variation in the timing of
planned meetings with case workers and ﬁnd that some types of meetings
have threat eﬀects in the sense that job-ﬁnding rates increase up to four weeks
before the meeting was planned to take place, and moreover, some types of
meetings have an eﬀect after the meeting has taken place. This holds espe-
cially for meetings where programme participation is planned. These results
again suggest the presence of monitoring and threat eﬀects, but also meet-
5ings with a counseling content have positive eﬀects suggesting an additional
counseling eﬀect.
Hägglund (2006) uses experimental data from three Swedish demonstra-
tion programmes to investigate threat eﬀects. He ﬁnds that, when applied
to a broad group of unemployed workers, a programme consisting of job-
search activities in groups combined with increased monitoring led to a two
week reduction in unemployment duration through an increase in the exit
rate to employment after referral to the programme but before the actual
programme start. Increased monitor i n ga l o n ed i dn o th a v et h es a m ee ﬀect.
Moreover, similar programmes targeted speciﬁcally to the young and the
highly educated did not show evidence of threat eﬀects.
For U.S. data, Black et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the unemployed react to
the notiﬁcation of programme participation by letter by increasing their job-
ﬁnding rate by as much as 50%. Incidentally, this corresponds to a reduction
of unemployment duration of 2.2 weeks.
Geerdsen (2006) shows that, for a group of Danish unemployed workers,
the exit rate from unemployment rises sharply as they approach the time of
mandatory programme participation. He uses legislative changes in the tim-
ing of the mandatory programme participation period to identify the threat
eﬀect of programmes.
Rosholm & Svarer (2008) use a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy, namely,
they estimate the risk of having to participate in a programme jointly with
the job-ﬁnding rate (the timing-of-events model of Abbring & van den Berg,
2003), but they also include the programme participation hazard as an ex-
planatory variable in the job-ﬁnding rate. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant threat ef-
fect of ALMPs, which reduces average unemployment duration by 2.5 weeks.
Geerdsen & Holm (2007) use a similar, but not completely identical, tech-
nique and ﬁnd basically qualitatively similar results.
Summarising this selective literature review, there is a tendency towards
ﬁnding positive eﬀects of counseling and monitoring policies, although the
evidence is not unanimous. With respect to threat eﬀects, the evidence
seems to be quite unidirectional; there are strong threat eﬀects of monitoring
p o l i c i e sa sw e l la sa c t i v el a b o u rm a r k e tp r o g r a m m e s .
3 The Social Experiment
This social experiment in labour market policies was carried out in the coun-
ties of Southern Jutland and Storstrøm.1 Workers eligible for unemployment
1Until January 1st, 2007, there were 14 counties in Denmark. On that date, the counties
were merged into ﬁve regions. The observation period for this study, however, ends before
6insurance (UI) beneﬁts who became unemployed during the weeks 43-2005
until 8-2006, that is, essentially from the beginning of November 2005 until
the end of February 2006, were randomly assigned into a treatment and a
control group, based on their date of birth in the month. Those born on the
1st to the 15th were assigned to the treatment group, while those born on the
16th to the 31st were assigned to the control group. Those in the treatment
group were given the following treatment:
1. After approximately 1.5 weeks in open unemployment (that is, during
the second week of their unemployment spell) they receive a letter
telling them about the new policy regime. They are not told explicitly
that it is an experiment with randomisation, but they are told that
they are taking part in a ’pilot study’ regarding a new labour market
policy regime. They are also told about the contents of the new labour
market policy regime, which is described below:
2. After 5-6 weeks of unemployment, they shall participate in a two-week
Job Search Assistance (JSA) programme.
3. Thereafter, they shall meet frequently with a case worker in order to
ensure that they are searching actively and in order to assist them in
their job search. In the country of Southern Jutland, meetings will take
place every fortnight, and in the county of Storstrøm meetings will take
place each week.
4. Those who have not found employment after four months of unemploy-
ment have to participate in an unspeciﬁed programme of at least three
months’ duration.
The timeline in terms of unemployment duration for the treatment group
is shown graphically in Figure 1. Note that it is not possible to escape treat-
ment by leaving unemployment for a short period. Persons in the treatment
group who return to unemployment during the period of the experiment will
enter the experiment at the stage where they left it, i.e. if a person left un-
employment for a few weeks just before having to participate in a full time
programme, his duration clock is not reset when he re-enters unemployment.
< Figure 1 about here >
2007.
7In both the treatment and control groups, unemployed workers would
have to attend a CV/basic registration meeting within four weeks after be-
coming unemployed. Persons in the control group are subjected to the ordi-
nary labour market policy, implying that they have to attend meetings with
case workers once every three months, and after one year of unemployment
they are required to participate in an unspeciﬁed programme of unspeciﬁed
duration. They have the right to participate in a programme of their own
choice for up to six weeks during the ﬁr s ty e a ri nu n e m p l o y m e n t .T h et i m e
span between programmes should hereafter be shorter than six months.2
The regions have the possibility to use private contractors for conducting
elements of the active policy, and this possibility applies to both treatment
and control groups. We shall return to this later.
4D a t a
The data used for this study come from the administrative databases used by
the case workers to register their dealings with the unemployed workers, from
the central register on the labour market (CRAM) that registers UI beneﬁt
payments, and various other administrative registers. All data are collected
by The National Labour Market Board and made available to the research
community. The data contain weekly information on the type of transfer
received and the activities undertaken in each week (meetings, programmes,
etc.) for each worker. It is thus a very informative and interesting data set.
4.1 Sample Selection
The total inﬂow to open unemployment in the period between week 43 of 2005
and week 8 of 2006 was 5180 individuals. Some of these are removed from
t h es a m p l es u b s e q u e n t l yf o rv a r i o u sr e a s o n s ,s e eT a b l e1 .F i r s t ,s o m ea r en o t
assigned correctly to treatment and control groups based on an inspection of
their birthday. Second, some are unemployed due to ’bad weather’ and due
to ’work-sharing arrangements’, and since these categories of unemployed
workers are not supposed to take part in the experiment, they are removed
from the sample. In the third step, we remove persons who die or emigrate
during the observation period, since we do not know the exact date of the
event. Finally, in the fourth step we remove individuals who do not receive
2The reform of labour market policy in 2003 involved exactly this loosening, where the
intensity of the labour market policies is reduced dramatically, from the requirement to
participate in programmes 80% of the remaining time in unemployment to the requirement
to participate in a programme of unspeciﬁed duration every six months.
8any UI beneﬁts during the ﬁrst six weeks of their unemployment spell. This
is done because the receipt of UI beneﬁts deﬁnes the unemployment spell.
Some of these are simply categorised incorrectly by the case worker as UI
recipients, although in fact they may receive unemployment assistance or
some other beneﬁt, in which case diﬀerent rules apply to them. The reason
for choosing a six-week window is that we want to include persons who have
just left education or who have quit their job themselves, and these events
involve a ﬁve-week sanction period, in which the person may not receive UI
beneﬁts.
< Table 1 about here >
The sample selection process, especially the last stage, removes a larger
fraction in Southern Jutland county - around 15% - than in Storstrøm county,
w h e r eo n l y1 2 %a r er e m o v e d .W ea r en o ta b l et oc o m eu pw i t hac o n v i n c i n g
explanation for this, but there are no remarkable diﬀerences in the fractions
removed between treatments and controls.
The resulting sample has 4513 individuals, and this is the sample which
we shall analyse in the following. For each individual we determine the
length of the unemployment spell that triggered their participation in the
experiment. The unemployment spell is considered to have ended when the
individual has not received UI beneﬁts or some related beneﬁtf o rm o r et h a n
four consecutive weeks.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Besides the information used to construct unemployment spells, the data
contain some further information that can be used to construct control vari-
ables. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics by region and treatment status.
First, we know the calendar week in which the unemployment spell began.
As it can be observed, most unemployment spells begin in the start of a
month, and there is a particularly large fraction becoming unemployed in
the ﬁrst week of January. The reason that no unemployment spells began
in week 51 is that the employment agencies were closed, since this was the
week of Christmas.
< Table 2 about here >
9Gender and age of each worker is also known, and the latter is used
to construct indicators for age intervals. Moreover, we have information
about the ethnicity of the worker, and it is used to create indicators for
being a native Dane, being an immigrant or descendant originating in a
Western country, or being an immigrant or descendant originating in a Non-
Western country. The fact that all workers are UI fund members allows
us to construct indicators of groups of UI funds, which are considered to
be decent proxies for educational attainment (which is unfortunately not
available for this sample). Finally, s i n c ew eh a v ew e e k l yi n f o r m a t i o no n
public income transfer receipt going back to 1994, we can calculate some
past labour market history information. We construct three variables, the
ﬁrst measures the fraction of time spent on public income transfers the 52
weeks immediately before becoming unemployed, the second measures the
same fraction 53-104 weeks before becoming unemployed, and the last one
does the same for 105-156 weeks before that.
From Table 2 it is seen that there is a diﬀerence in unemployment duration
between treatment and control groups in both regions, and there is also a
diﬀerence in the fraction of uncensored unemployment spells. This is the ﬁrst
indication that the treatment has a positive impact in the sense of reducing
unemployment duration. However, for the control variables there are no
remarkable diﬀerences between treatments and controls, although there are
minor regional diﬀerences. Thus, the sample selection process does not seem
to have invalidated the experimental nature of the data.
5 What is The Treatment?
Before going into details with the estimation of the treatment eﬀect, some
space is devoted to discussing the treatment itself. Although the treatment
appears to be quite precisely deﬁned, there is still some scope for discretion
by region and by case worker, and we also have to take into account that
the control group outcomes are not the result of non-treatment but rather
of a diﬀerent, less intensive, treatment. We have remarkable data about
the precise treatment administered to each individual. For each worker, we
know all programmes in which the worker participates as well as the exact
timing of these programmes. We also know date and type of each meeting
attended. Moreover, we know if the treatment of the worker is being handled
by case workers in the employment agency or if it has been contracted out
to a private agency.
Most of the following discussion is based on ﬁg u r e sa n dn u m b e r sn o ti n -
cluded in the paper, but these ﬁgures are obviously available on request. The
10timing of the ﬁrst CV/basic registration meeting should be fairly equal across
the treatments and controls, as all unemployed workers have to attend this
meeting during the ﬁrst four weeks in unemployment. In Southern Jutland,
this appears to be the case, and after 10 weeks 97% in the treatment group
and 95% in the control group have attended this meeting.3 In Storstrøm
county, this meeting is not held as often, and it is more likely to be held with
persons in the treatment group than in the control group. After 10 weeks in
unemployment, only 76% among those in the treatment group and 70% in
the control group have attended the ﬁrst CV/basic registration meeting.
The entry rates into the ﬁrst JSA programme are plotted in Figures 2 and
3. There is a clear diﬀerence between treatment and control groups in both
counties. In Storstrøm county, control group members receive the treatment
much more rarely; indeed, after 12 weeks of unemployment, 84% of those
in the treatment group have entered the programme, but only 31% in the
control group have done so.4 However, the treatment is given with some
delay compared to the intended timing; after 7 weeks of unemployment, only
53% in the treatment group have begun the treatment. In Southern Jutland,
this treatment is not given to control group members at all, or at least only
very rarely. After 30 weeks of unemployment, only 1% in the control group
has entered a JSA programme. In the treatment group, attendance to this
programme is somewhat below what it should have been, as can be witnessed
by the programme entry rates in Figure 3. Moreover, after 12 weeks of un-
employment only 63% in the treatment group have entered this programme,
and those who did enter did so later than intended; after 7 weeks only 16%
had begun the programme.
< Figures 2-3 about here >
There are four types of meetings held with the unemployed workers; ﬁrst,
there is the CV/basic registration meeting discussed above. Here, the unem-
ployed worker meets with a case worker and prepares a CV to be published
on the ’internet CV-bank’, which is a database where employers can ﬁnd
CV’s of workers available for work. In ’job-plan’ meetings, an action plan for
getting back to work is formulated and agreed upon between case worker and
client. The agreements include agreeing on programme participation, both
3These numbers are based on the estimated survival functions for the time until this
type of meeting. They are not shown here, but are available on request.
4This information is again based on the estimated survival function for entry into this
type of programme. Plots are available on request.
11type and approximate dates of entry. Next, there are ’contact-meetings’,
which are meetings in which the progress and job search strategies of the
unemployed worker is discussed. Changes to the agreed action plan can also
be made during these meetings. Finally, there are job assignment meetings
and job interviews, which are typically spaced sequentially and quite close
in time. In the job assignment meeting, the case worker informs the worker
about an open vacancy, and it is decided whether the worker should apply
for the job. If so, a job interview is organised at the ﬁrm with the vacancy.
Here, the case worker typically does not participate, but the event is still
registered as a meeting.
In Storstrøm country, the ’contact-meeting’ rate increases to almost 40%
during the period between the ﬁrst JSA programme and the programme that
has to begin around weeks 16-18. The intensity of these meetings continues
to be higher in the treatment group than in the control group until week
35. In Southern Jutland county, the increase in the contact-meeting rate for
this type of meetings sets in a little later, which probably reﬂects the later
treatment time for the JSA programme. The meeting rate comes close to
30% and it stays above the meeting rate in the control group throughout the
entire observation period.
The other types of meetings have lower intensities, but for all of them
there is a higher intensity in the treatment group than in the control group
in both counties over most of the observed duration of unemployment.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the overall meeting intensity, that is, the fraction
of those still unemployed in a given week who attend any type of meeting.
This reveals that except in week 4, the meeting intensity is much higher
in Storstrøm county than it is in Southern Jutland county. However, in
Storstrøm county it is around 0.4, where it should have been 1. Hence, case
workers meet with unemployed workers only every 2.5 weeks on average,
where they should have done so each week. In Southern Jutland, the meet-
ing rate is around 30% in the period between ﬁrst and second programme,
implying that case worker and client meet every 3 weeks on average, where
they should have done so every other week.
< Figures 4-5 about here >
When it comes to programme participation, regions and case workers
had some discretion in how to allocate workers to programmes. Basically,
they had a selection of 5 types of programmes to choose from; ﬁrst there
were the JSA programmes described above. These consist in determining
12the capabilities of the unemployed worker and helping her to search for jobs
she would be able to perform.
The second type of programme is ’private sector temporary employment
subsidy jobs’. These involve temporary employment in a private ﬁrm at the
negotiated wage, where the employment agency pays a subsidy to the ﬁrm
of around half the wage. These jobs typically have a duration of 6 months.
The third type of programme is temporary employment within the public
sector. These typically last 6-12 months.
The fourth type of programme is classroom training programmes, which
confound anything from IT courses to courses in brick-laying to truck drivers’
license courses, but the focus is mostly on classical classroom training courses,
hence the denomer. These are typically of a shorter duration, ranging from
a few weeks to courses of very long duration, but with the majority being
shorter than 3 months.
Finally, there are vocational training programmes in ﬁrms. These typi-
cally last a few months.
Again, ﬁgures for participation intensity in each programme type are
available on request but not included due to space considerations. In both
regions, 8-12% of unemployed workers in the treatment group participate
in ’private-sector temporary employment subsidy jobs’ around weeks 20-30,
w h i l et h es a m ef r a c t i o ni nt h ec o n t r o lg r o u p si sa r o u n d4 - 6 % .
With respect to participation in public-sector temporary jobs, some re-
markable diﬀerences are revealed; In Storstrøm county this type of pro-
gramme is used for 8-12% of the unemployed workers in the treatment group
in weeks 20-30, while the control group only is given this treatment at a rate
of 2%. However, in Southern Jutland county this programme is hardly used
during the ﬁrst 30 weeks in unemployment, and to the extent that it is, there
is no diﬀerence in treatment intensity between treatment and control groups.
Classroom training participation rates also diﬀer widely between the two
counties; in Storstrøm county, the participation rate goes up in the treatment
group through the entire period, peaking at 40% in week 45. This reﬂects
a steady inﬂow and fairly long durations in this type of programmes. The
participation rate also increases in the control group, but at a much lower
level, around 15%. In Southern Jutland county, these programmes are only
used about half as often, as the participation rate peaks around 20% for the
treatment group, but then the participation rate is also much lower for the
control group, peaking at 5%.
As regards vocational training in ﬁrms, the control group treatment is
quite similar in the two regions, around 1%, while the treatment group is
participating in this type of programme more often in Southern Jutland
county than in Storstrøm county. However, the participation rates are also
13quite low in the treatment groups for this programme.
In Figures 6 and 7, the overall programme participation rates are plotted
as functions of unemployment duration, that is, the fraction participating in
any programme in a given week among those who are still unemployed in
that week. Comparing treatment groups, the programme participation rate
is generally higher in Storstrøm county, where it increases earlier and peaks at
45% around week 35, while in Southern Jutland county it peaks at only 35%
around week 35. This is disappointing, since the programme participation
rate was supposed to be 100% in the treatment group in the weeks 18-30.
The fraction treated in the control groups is around 22% in Storstrøm county
and around 12% in Southern Jutland county, so the diﬀerence in programme
participation rates between treatment and control groups is similar in the
two regions, but the levels diﬀer.
< Figures 6-7 about here >
In general, the activity level, in terms of meetings and programme partici-
pation, is higher in Storstrøm county than in Southern Jutland county, but as
shown above, this holds for both treatments and controls. Figure 8 plots the
diﬀerence in activity rates between treatment and control groups in the two
counties, where the activity rate at a given duration is deﬁned as the num-
ber of unemployed individuals participating in a meeting or a programme at
that duration (week) divided by the total number of unemployed surviving
in unemployment at least until that duration. In unemployment duration
weeks 3-10, the diﬀerence between in treatment intensity between treatment
and control groups is much higher in Storstrøm than in Southern Jutland,
while in the weeks 11-18 the diﬀerence in treatment intensity is lower, but the
treatment group still gets relatively most treatment in Storstrøm. In weeks
19-33, the diﬀerence in treatment intensity between treatments and controls
is about the same in the two regions, and from week 33 and onwards the
diﬀerence between treatment and control group treatment intensity is larger
in Southern Jutland.
< Figure 8 about here >
Finally, we take a look at the extent to which the process of counseling
is delegated to private employment agencies in the two regions and for the
treatment and control groups. This is described in Figures 9 and 10. It is
14seen that in Southern Jutland county, slightly above 80% of the treatment
group are handled by private contractors, while this is only the case for
approximately 40% of the control group. In Storstrøm county, there are
no large diﬀerences in the extent to which private contractors are used, the
fraction is around 30% in both the treatment and the control group.
< Figures 9-10 about here >
The general pattern thus seems to be that in Storstrøm county, the ex-
periment has been conducted more in line with the experimental protocol,
while in Southern Jutland, enforcement has been more lax, and moreover the
treatments administered also diﬀer by handling agency in Southern Jutland.
However, none of the counties come close to the prescribed treatment intensi-
ties in the treatment group. Moreover, there is a diﬀerence in the timing and
intensity of the initial JSA programme, there is a diﬀerence in the meeting
intensities, and there is a diﬀerence in programme participation intensity and
type in the two regions. There are, in essence, two diﬀerent experiments, one
in each region, and they should therefore be analysed separately.
6 Methodology
The aim of the policy experiment is to reduce unemployment duration, that
is, by prescribing an early intervention scheme, it is hoped that unemployed
workers may be helped and motivated to search more eﬀectively and/or lower
their reservation wages. Thus, it would be in the spirit of the policy aim to
investigate the impact of the treatment on the duration of unemployment
spells. This could be done by comparison of the survival functions for the
treatment and control groups, which was done by Graversen & van Ours
(2008b). They found clear evidence of a positive treatment eﬀect in the
s e n s et h a ts u r v i v a lr a t e si nt h et r e a t m e n tg r o u pa r em u c hl o w e rt h a ni nt h e
control group. However, they did not perform the analysis separately by
regions.
By formulating parametric duration models, one would in principle be
able to extract more information regarding which of the speciﬁc policy in-
struments applied to the treatment group have an eﬀect and which do not.
However, such an analysis would have to deal with speciﬁcational issues, with
issues of dynamic selection bias, and - given that enforcement of the exper-
imental protocol is not perfect - with endogenous choice of treatments. In
order to avoid these issues altogether, one might be tempted to investigate
15alternative modeling strategies. However, given the dynamic nature of the
various treatments involved, and the necessity to exploit the variation in the
timings of these treatments for identiﬁcation, duration models appear to be
the most obvious choice if one wants to extract more information from the
experiment than what is revealed by survival functions or employment rates.
This implies that we have to deal with the issues mentioned above. In this
section, we will discuss how to deal with them one by one. We start by for-
mulating the fundamental evaluation problem in a duration model context.
Then we proceed to discuss distributional issues and dynamic selection bias,
and ﬁnally we turn to the issue of endogeneity of the instrument package
administered to a given individual in the treatment and in the control group.
6.1 The Evaluation Problem
The outcome of interest is T, the duration of unemployment spells. Denote
potential outcomes in the treatment state and non treatment state by T1 and
T0, respectively, and deﬁne the treatment indicator D, where a value of 1 in-
dicates receipt of treatment. Treatment in the present case denotes eligibility
for the entire package administered to those in the treatment group, that is,
the treatment is the new, more intensive, labour market policy regime. In
the sense of Abbring & van den Berg (2005), randomization essentially takes
p l a c ea tt h et i m eo fi n ﬂow to unemployment, treatment starts immediately,
and there is full compliance. In that respect, the treatment is the same as
the intention to treat. We can specify the average treatment eﬀect on the
expected duration of unemployment as
∆ = E[T1 − T0]
Given our deﬁnition of the treatment, there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between randomisation into the treatment group and actual receipt of
the treatment, this parameter is equal to the treatment eﬀect on the treated,
since the treated constitute a random sample from the inﬂow to unemploy-
ment. Hence,
∆ = E[T1 − T0|D =1 ]
Given randomisation, the unobserved counterfactual can be replaced by
the expected outcome in the control group, that is,
∆ = E[T1|D =1 ]− E[T0|D =0 ]
Now, for several reasons it is not straightforward to estimate ∆, ﬁrstly
due to right-censoring, and secondly, as shown below, due to dynamic sample
16selection eﬀects. Hence, we formulate treatment eﬀects also in terms of rel-
ative escape rates from unemployment. At time t, the hazard (escape) rate
in the treatment and non-treatment states are θ1(t) and θ0(t), respectively,




6.2 Speciﬁcation Issues and Dynamic Selection Bias
Suppose workers diﬀer by observed and unobserved characteristics, X and
V , respectively. Suppose V are random draws from the distribution FV (·).
Without loss of generality, assume for the moment that all characteristics are
unobserved to the researcher. At duration times 0 and 1,t h eh a z a r dr a t e s
a r es t i l lt h es a m ei nt h et r e a t m e n ta n dc o n t r o lg r o u p s ,s i n c et h e yh a v et h e
same information set. Formally,
θ1(0) = θ0(0)
θ1(1) = θ0(1),
where the subscript on the hazard rates indicates treatment status. In gen-
e r a l ,h o w e v e r ,t h i se q u a l i t yd o e sn o th o l df o rv a l u e so ft larger than 1,s i n c e
in the second week of unemployment, individuals in the treatment group are
provided with information about the new labour market policy regime (and
hence the treatment starts), and that information may immediately aﬀect
their behaviour. Let the hazard rates out of unemployment be
θi(t|V )=λi(t)V, i =0 ,1,
that is, they are mixed proportional hazard rates. In this case, the value of
the observed hazard rate at time t ≥ 2 is equal to
θi(t)=EV [θi(t|V )|Ti ≥ t]
= λi(t) · EV[V |Ti ≥ t]
since the expectation has to be taken over those still unemployed at time t.
The expression
EV[V |Ti ≥ t]=
Z
V · dFV(V |T ≥ t)
depends on the distribution of V conditional on survival in unemployment
at least until t. This distribution can be derived in the following manner:
F(Ti ≥ t,V )=FV(V |Ti ≥ t) · P(Ti ≥ t),
17and by a straighforward application of Bayes’ rule, we obtain the following
FV(V |Ti ≥ t)=
F(Ti ≥ t,V )
Pr(Ti ≥ t)
=
Pr(Ti ≥ t|V ) · FV(V ) R
Pr(Ti ≥ t|V ) · dFV(V )
It is clear that as long as θi(·) does not depend on i, there is no problem,
but when information about the experiment arrives (in the form of a letter)
to the nemployed workers, the experiment starts aﬀecting the hazard rates
of individuals in the treatment and control groups diﬀerently, and therefore
the conditional distribution Pr(Ti ≥ t|V ) depends on i. This phenomenon
is known in the literature as ’dynamic sample selection’, and it implies that,
although the distribution of unobservables is identical in the treatment and
control groups at the time of randomization, T =0 , once the experiment
starts aﬀecting the exit rates from unemployment, the distribution of unob-
servables among the survivors in unemployment will start to diﬀer between
the treatment and control groups. The issue of dynamic selection in duration
model contexts is treated in detail by Abbring & van den Berg (2005).
Hence, an identiﬁcation strategy must be able to account for dynamic
selection bias. This is exactly the strength of the duration model framework,
where the hazard rates - the selection process out of the state of interest -
are explicitly modeled.
We shall begin by making an assumption of a mixed proportional hazard
(MPH) model, that is, the hazard rates can be written in the following form
θ1(t|X,V)=λ1(t) · exp[f1(X)] · V
θ0(t|X,V)=λ0(t) · exp[f0(X)] · V
We further assume that f1(·)=f0(·)=f(·). This is of course a restrictive
assumption, but one that is in the spirit of the MPH assumption. It implies
that the treatment aﬀects the baseline hazard, but does not aﬀect the way in
which observed explanatory variables aﬀect the hazard rates. The observed
hazard rate can now be written in the following form:
θ(t|x,d,v)=λ0(t) · exp[f(x)+dδθ(t)] · v,
where
δθ(t) ≡ lnλ1(t) − lnλ0(t)
This duration model nonparametrically identiﬁes the time-varying treat-
ment eﬀect on the hazard rate, given the mixed proportional hazards as-
sumption and the randomised treatment.
18If one wants to proceed non-parametrically, Abbring & van den Berg
(2005) show that with the assumption of proportional hazards and an addi-
tional assumption of monotonicity of the eﬀect of treatment on the relative
hazard - e.g. the treatment eﬀe c ti sp o s i t i v e( n e g a t i v e )a ta l ld u r a t i o n s-t h e
diﬀerence in the empirical hazard rates constitute a lower (upper) bound on
the true treatment eﬀect.
6.3 Inference Regarding SpeciﬁcT r e a t m e n t s
A certain package of treatments is administered to each individual in the
treatment group, and these treatments are to some extent perceived as be-
ing exogenous. However, some do not even participate in the initial JSA
treatment, although they have unemployment spells that are long enough
that they should have participated. Moreover, the meetings intensities are
lower than that which was intended, and the full-time programme participa-
tion from week 16-18 onwards is not enforced perfectly, either. This leads to
t h er e a l i s a t i o nt h a tt h es p e c i ﬁc treatments in the treatment groups (as well
as in the control groups, where case workers and unemployed workers have
more discretion) may be endogenous, even if the assignment to the treatment
group is purely exogenous, rendering causal inference regarding their impacts
tricky at best.
Let the speciﬁc time-varying treatments administered to the treatment
group be captured by the (time-varying) vector of indicators D1(T),a n d
deﬁne speciﬁc treatments in the control group by D0(t).W e n o w h a v e t h e
following model
θ(t|x,d,d0(t),d 1(t),v)=λ0(t) · exp[f(x)+dδθ(t)+d1(t)δ1(t)+d0(t)δ0(t)] · v
Note that we allow for the possibility of a treatment eﬀect over and above
the sum of speciﬁct r e a t m e n te ﬀects, which is possible if the sum of spe-
ciﬁct r e a t m e n ti m p a c t sd o e sn o ta d du pt ot h et o t a lt r e a t m e n te ﬀect, which
could be the case if e.g. speciﬁct r e a t m e n t sh a v e’ e xa n t e ’i m p a c t s ,o ri ft h e
knowledge of being in the treatment group aﬀects individual behaviour, e.g.
through awareness of the increased intensity of monitoring and programme
participation requirements.
If we estimate this model with maximum likelihood, not taking into ac-
count the endogeneity of speciﬁc treatments, the estimated parameters may
be biased. However, to the extent that there is random variation in the tim-
ing of the treatment, the ’timing-of-events’ speciﬁcation of Abbring & Van
den Berg (2003) can be used to identify treatment eﬀects for those in the
treatment groups as well as for those in the control groups. This requires
19separate estimation of the time until treatment and the type of treatment
for individuals in treatment and control groups. Given the number of treat-
m e n t si nt h ep a c k a g ea n dt h ep r e s e n c eo fr e p e a t e dt r e a t m e n t s( m e e t i n g s ) ,t h i s
strategy seems infeasible. Instead, our strategy shall be to estimate the pa-
rameters in the model above, conditioning on a large selection of explanatory
variables, including past labour market histories, so that a conditional inde-
pendence assumption may be invoked to identify speciﬁct r e a t m e n te ﬀects.
This is obviously a short-cut, but given the infeasibility of the timing-of-
events speciﬁcation, and given the lack of access to instrumental variables,
the strategy chosen produces impact estimates that are valid under an as-
sumption of conditional independence, the validity of which can be judged
by inspection of the included observed explanatory variables.5 To the extent
that a bias may remain, we shall discuss the likely direction of it. A simple
logit model, estimated only for members of the treatment group, for partici-
pating in an activity (deﬁned as a meeting or a programme) in a given week
as a function of duration, starting week, and the same set of background
v a r i a b l e sa st h o s eu s e di nt h em o d e l ss p e c i ﬁced below reveal that men are
less likely to participate in an activity, persons with more past unemploy-
ment are less likely to participate, as are the oldest workers in the sample,
while the young are much more likely to participate. Members of certain UI
funds (construction) are much more likely to participate. Hence, it is neces-
sary to invoke a conditional independence assumption, as an unconditional
independence assumption is certainly violated.6
7R e s u l t s
7.1 Non-parametric analyses
Figures 11 and 12 show Kaplan Meier survival functions in unemployment
for unemployed workers in Storstrøm and Southern Jutland county, respec-
tively. Conﬁdence bands are calculated from the standard errors suggested
in Lancaster (1990). The ﬁgure for Storstrøm county shows that the sur-
vival functions start diverging almost from the ﬁrst week in unemployment,
and the conﬁdence intervals are non-overlapping from around week 7 in un-
5In the context of Abbring & van den Berg (2005), the randomization indicator itself
is an instrumental variable. However, this precludes the case in which knowledge of the
experiment can have ex ante eﬀects, hence, in our case, using randomization as an IV
would not identify the speciﬁct r e a t m e n te ﬀects due to dynamic selection taking place
before the actual treatment.
6These results are not reported in the paper but are available on request from the
author.
20employment. Half of the unemployed workers in the treatment group have
left unemployment after 11 weeks of unemployment, while the halving time
for the control group is 13 weeks. At 18 weeks of unemployment - when
programme participation should ideally be administered full time to every
one in the treatment group - there are 28% left in unemployment (including
programme participation) in the treatment group versus 37% in the control
group. After 32 weeks the conﬁdence intervals around the survival functions
start overlapping again. For Southern Jutland county, the survival functions
do not start diverging until week 6 in unemployment. After 10 weeks in
unemployment the conﬁdence bands are non-overlapping, and they continue
to be non-overlapping for the remainder of the period in unemployment un-
til the 40th week. In the treatment group, the halving time is around 11-12
weeks, while in the control group it is around 13-14 weeks, i.e. approximately
the same as in Storstrøm county. After 18 weeks in unemployment, there are
31% left in unemployment in the treatment group compared to 39% in the
control group. This is for both groups slightly 2-3 percentage points more
than in Storstrøm county. For both counties, the Integrated survival func-
tions suggest a reduction in the average duration of unemployment over the
ﬁrst 46 weeks of slightly more than 2.2 weeks, in Storstrøm county from 16.4
to 14.2 weeks, and in Southern Jutland from 17.2 to 15.1 weeks.
< Figures 11-12 about here >
Figures 13 and 14 show the corresponding empirical exit rates from un-
employment. It is seen that, in both regions, the raw exit rates out of unem-
ployment are higher in the treatment group than in the control group at least
until week 20. However, these results are likely to understate the ’true’ eﬀect
of the treatment due to dynamic selection bias; as members of the treatment
group leave unemployment faster, there is the possibility that exit is selective
with respect to unobservables (and all explanatory variables are unobserved
for the Kaplan-Meier estimator). Indeed, as mentioned above, under certain
assumptions, the Kaplan-Meier hazard rates constitute a lower bound for the
true treatment eﬀect.
< Figures 13-14 about here >
In conclusion, it is apparent that the treatment, deﬁned as the labour
market regime administered to those in the treatment group, has reduced
21unemployment duration by increasing the exit rates from unemployment, at
least in some duration intervals. What remains is to see whether we can
determine which of the speciﬁc treatments, if any, have contributed to the
overall eﬀect, and whether the overall eﬀect can be attributed to speciﬁc
duration intervals, once we try to eliminate dynamic selection bias.
7.2 Parametric models
All models were estimated by including a selection of background character-
istics and allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. Since the fraction of sur-
vivors in unemployment is fairly low, the maximization of the log likelihood
invariably ends up preferring a speciﬁcation with two unobserved ’types’, one
small group (1-2% of the inﬂow into unemployment) of ’immune’persons with
az e r oe x i tr a t ef r o mu n e m p l o y m e n t ,a n dt h eo t h e ral a r g eg r o u pw i t hap o s -
itive exit rate from unemployment. The coeﬃcients to observed explanatory
variables do not change very much between model speciﬁcations, therefore
they are only reported in Appendix Table A1 for a basic speciﬁcation called
Model 1 below, and we shall not spend time discussing each coeﬃcient here.7
The general pattern is that men have higher exit rates from unemployment
than women, the exit rates decline with age in general, and those with more
dependence on public income transfers in the past have lower exit rates.
As a benchmark, we ﬁr s te s t i m a t et h em o d e lw i t h a completely free speci-
ﬁcation of the baseline and the treatment eﬀect. In essence, this corresponds
to estimating separate baseline hazard functions for treatments and controls,
and the treatment eﬀect is then the diﬀerence between the two. These esti-
mates are presented in Figure 15, where the multiplicative weekly treatment
eﬀects have been smoothed using a centered three-week moving average. A
couple of interesting patterns emerge; ﬁrst of all, there is a positive treat-
ment eﬀect in both counties, and in the duration interval of the experiment
(weeks 2-30), those in the treatment group have a 20-40% higher exit rate
from unemployment than those in the control group. This result basically
holds in both counties, although there are some diﬀerences. Interestingly,
the eﬀect early in the unemployment spell appears to be larger in Southern
Jutland (where the activity rates were lower). From weeks 10-26, the eﬀect
is approximately of the same size in the two counties, but from week 26, the
eﬀect becomes signiﬁcantly negative in Storstrøm county, while it continues
to be positive in Southern Jutland.
7All detailed parameter estimates are of course available on request from the author.
22< Figure 15 about here >
Table 3 reports results from two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a parametric
duration model, one where we estimate an average treatment eﬀect, called
Model 1, and one where we allow the treatment eﬀect to vary with the
duration of unemployment, which we call Models 2. The intervals for the
treatment eﬀect in Model 2 have been set so as to allow for changes in
treatment eﬀects according to the progression in the experiment, cf. Figure
1.
The results in Table 3 thus represent estimates of the eﬀect of being in
the new treatment regime. In both regions, there is a signiﬁcant positive
time-invariant treatment eﬀect of about the same size, corresponding to a
20-22% increase in the exit rate from unemployment. In Model 2, it can be
seen that the treatment eﬀe c ti sl a r g ed u r i n gt h ew e e k s5 - 1 5o fu n e m p l o y m e n t
d u r a t i o ni nb o t hc o u n t i e s ,b u t ,a sw a sa l s oo b s e r v e di nﬁgure 15, it is largest
in Southern Jutland county. In the weeks 16-22 it stays large in Storstrøm,
while it starts withering oﬀ in Southern Jutland. After the 22nd week of
unemployment, there is no longer a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect.
< Table 3 about here >
Table 4 shows Model 3, in which we still have time-varying indicators for
belonging to the treatment group, as in Model 2, but now we also include
time-varying indicators of programme participation and completion, and at-
tendance of meetings in the current and in past weeks. These indicators are
included for both treatment and control groups members, and the eﬀects of
these speciﬁc treatments are allowed to vary between treatment and control
groups. It is seen that none of the speciﬁct r e a t m e n t sa d m i n i s t e r e dh a v ep o s -
itive impacts in general. However, the time-varying indicators for belonging
to the treatment group are still positive and signiﬁcant for the same intervals
as in Model 2. Some of them are even larger in this speciﬁcation, as if to
compensate for the negative eﬀect of the speciﬁc treatments.
< Table 4 about here >
These results indicate that it is not the actual meetings and programme
participation periods that aﬀect the individuals’ job-ﬁnding rates. This is
23somewhat surprising given the relatively large treatment regime eﬀect esti-
mated in Model 2. One possible explanation for the positive treatment eﬀect
of the overall programme is that there is a ’threat eﬀect’ of the treatment
regime itself; what generates the positive treatment eﬀects are the percep-
tions of the more intensive labour market policy regime; the knowledge that
in the future you will be monitored weekly and placed in programmes contin-
uously apparently induces either more active job search or lower reservation
wages. Alternatively, it may be the speciﬁc knowledge that you have to
participate in some speciﬁc event that triggers the increase in job-ﬁnding
rates.
Unfortunately, we cannot measure the impact of future events (planned
meeting and programme participation periods) directly, as we have only in-
formation on meetings and programmes that actually took place. That is,
meetings that are cancelled because the person found a job the week before
the planned meeting are not available in this data set.8 Hence, the direct
eﬀect of announcements of meetings and programme participation periods
cannot be estimated from the available data.
However, we can estimate the weekly likelihood of participating in some
activity; the activity rate, and then we can include the activity rate as an
additional explanatory variable in the duration model. The activity rate is
0 in the weeks when activities are taking place, because in these weeks, the
eﬀect of participating are captured in the coeﬃcients to the ’in programme’
indicators. This approach is similar in spirit to that used by Rosholm &
Svarer (2008). If signiﬁcantly positive, the coeﬃcient on the activity rate
captures the eﬀect that individuals who - in a given week - are more at risk of
having to participate in some activity are more likely to leave unemployment.
Note that the activity rate is not perfectly collinear with the set of in-
cluded explanatory variables in the duration model, because of the interaction
it entails between the explanatory variables and the duration of unemploy-
ment; since the activity rates vary from week to week, and across individuals,
this interaction identiﬁes its coeﬁcient in the duration model. For further dis-
cussion, see Rosholm & Svarer (2008).
In Table A2 in the Appendix, we report the results from a logit model
for participating in any activity, meeting or programme, in a given week, for
each region. In the logit model, the dependent variable takes the value 1 for
an individual in a given week, if the person attends a meeting or participates
in a programme in that week. The activity rates are plotted in Figure A1
8Kjærsgaard et al. (2008) employ another data set and provide a more general analysis
of meetings and monitoring regimes in a non-experimental setting.
24in the appendix (these are also the activity rates underlying the diﬀerences
that were plotted in Figure 8). As explanatory variables, we include all the
background information included in the duration models above as well as
weekly duration indicators and treatment group indicators, and we allow for
time-varying treatment regime parameters as in the duration model. The re-
sults indicate that allocation to activities is not completely random; most of
the variation in activity comes from the treatment group (since their activity
rates are much higher than in the control group), and including interactions
between belonging to treatment and control groups and other explanatory
variables does not dramatically alter these results). For example, the young
and Non-western immigrants are more likely to participate in some activity,
while in Southern Jutland, those with a lot of past unemployment are more
likely to be in some activity at any point in time. In Storstrøm, there is a
tendency towards the opposite. There is also quite a bit of variation between
activity rates between diﬀerent UI funds, for example academics participate
much more in activities in Southern Jutland, while white collar workers par-
ticipate much less, while in Storstrøm technicians and construction workers
have high activity rates.
As mentioned above, the estimated activity rate constitutes an indepen-
dent random variable when compared to the variables included in the du-
ration model, because it consists of (a nonlinear function of) an interaction
between a linear function of the observed explanatory variables and a func-
tion of unemployment duration. Hence, to include the estimated activity
rate into the duration model does not lead to identiﬁcation problems, the
model is still non-parametrically identiﬁed.9
In Table 5, we report the results from the estimation of a duration model,
where the estimated activity rate is included in the model in weeks when the
individual is not participating in some activity. When the individual is partic-
ipating in an activity, this is captured by time-varying indicators as in Model
3, Table 4 above. Interestingly, the parameter on the estimated activity rate
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in both regions, although it is much
larger in Southern Jutland county than in Storstrøm. Moreover, inclusion
of the estimated activity rate renders the treatment regime eﬀect insigniﬁ-
cant in all time periods in both regions. In Southern Jutland, the positive
coeﬃcients on the indicator for belonging to the treatment group disappear
e n t i r e l y ,s u g g e s t i n gt h a tw eh a v ei n d e e di d e n t i ﬁed an important mechanism
9The model is similar in spirit to that applied by Rosholm & Svarer (2008) to estimate
the threat eﬀect of active labour market programmes. They estimated the rate of entry into
programmes as a measure of the ’threat’. In the present context with frequent meetings
and repeated events, the activity rate seems a more appropriate measure of the ’risk’ of
an activity.
25triggering the diﬀerence between the treatment and control group, at least in
Southern Jutland. In Storstrøm, the conclusion is qualitatively in the same
direction, but the evidence is not quite as compelling as it is in Southern
Jutland.
< Table 5 about here >
Finally, in Table 6, we include an estimated meetings intensity and pro-
gramme participation rate separately, and include both into the duration
model. These are also estimated in logit models, the results of which are
available on request. The main parameters from the estimation of this model
are reported in Table 6.
< Table 6 about here >
These results indicate that the experiment has indeed been carried out
quite diﬀerently in the two regions, with threat eﬀects being much more pro-
nounced in Southern Jutland than in Storstrøm county. In Storstrøm county,
only the estimated meetings intensity has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the
exit rate from unemployment rate, while the estimated programme partici-
pation rate is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. In Southern Jutland
county, both meetings intensities and programme participation rates have
large and statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on the exit rate from un-
employment. Hence, it appears in general as if meetings have larger threat
eﬀects than programmes, which is quite interesting, since it indicates that
the monitoring part of counseling and monitoring programmes is the most
important one. Moreover, in Southern Jutland, this model implies a signif-
icantly negative diﬀerence between treatment and control groups in weeks
19-22 after the taking into account actual programme and meeting as well as
measures of the treatment regime intensity. This is probably because some
individuals have a large probability of participating in both meetings and
programmes in a given week. Hence, to include both risk measures may lead
to a correction which in some sense is too large if only the risk of participating
in ’some activity’ is relevant.
To sum up, we ﬁnd that the intensiﬁcation of the labour market regime
has led to a fairly large reduction in unemployment duration of around 2.2
weeks (15%). The actual meetings held and programmes administered to
the unemployed workers do no not explain away the diﬀerence between the
26treatment and control groups, but upon including a measure of the inten-
sity of the treatment regime, the diﬀerence between treatment and control
groups tend to disappear. Finally, meetings appear to be a more than perfect
substitute for programme participation in terms of generating threat eﬀects.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses a social experiment in labour market policy - providing
early and intensive monitoring and programme participation in unemploy-
ment spells - to assess the nature of labour market policy eﬀectiveness.
The experiment was conducted in two counties in Denmark during the
winter of 2005-6. The treatment consisted of a dramatic intensiﬁcation of
labour market policies, involving information, very early mandatory partici-
pation in job search assistance programmes, frequent meetings with employ-
ment oﬃcers, and full time programme participation for at least three months
if they had not found employment before 18 weeks of unemployment.
Inspection of the survival functions shows a dramatic treatment eﬀect in
both counties. However, the fact that the treatment consists of complex com-
binations of meetings and diﬀerent types of programmes placed diﬀerently
i nt i m em e a n st h a ti ti sd i ﬃcult to disentangle the impacts of each treat-
ment separately, but conditioning on a large set of explanatory variables and
exploiting the variation in timing of speciﬁc activities allows us to identify
separate treatment eﬀects in a duration model framework.
We ﬁnd interesting results; ﬁrst, the intensiﬁcation of labour market pol-
icy is highly eﬀective, leading to increases in the exit rate from unemployment
ranging from 20-40%, varying by region and elapsed unemployment duration.
Second, when introducing time-varying indicators for the various speciﬁc
treatments actually prescribed to the unemployed workers - job search as-
sistance, various types of meetings, and various programmes - none of those
treatments have a positive eﬀect on the exit rate from unemployment, nei-
ther during the week in which the activity takes place, nor after the activity
is completed; indeed, some of them have large negative lock-in eﬀects, and
some even have large negative post-programme eﬀects.
However, the estimated risk of participating in an activity in a given week
has a strong positive eﬀect on the job-ﬁnding rate. When the estimated risk
of participating in an activity is included, it explains away the diﬀerence in
job-ﬁnding rates between treatment and control groups completely in one of
the counties, and reduces it dramatically and renders it insigniﬁcant in the
other county.
The interpretation we attach to these results is the following; since indi-
27vidual treatments do not appear to be eﬀective per se,b u tt h er i s ko ft r e a t -
m e n ti s ,i tm u s tb et h a tt h ei n t e n s i ﬁcation of the policy regime increases
the job-ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers. It is not a composition eﬀect,
since the workers were not aware of the policy intensiﬁcation before becom-
ing unemployed. Hence, the prospects of being constantly monitored as a
consequence of attending frequent meetings, and of having to participate in
programmes after 5 weeks of unemployment and again after 18 weeks, acts
by way of increasing the search activity or lowering the reservation wage of
unemployed workers, and this indirect eﬀect strongly dominates the nega-
tive eﬀects of actually participating in the activities. This eﬀect we label
at h r e a te ﬀect; namely, the threat eﬀect is driven by the perceived risk of
having to attend some activity, and the treatment eﬀect we found in this
study is precisely generated by the perceived intensiﬁcation of monitoring
and programme participation prospects.
The experiment points to a more general observation on the eﬀectiveness
of active labour market policies; despite the variation in the implementation
of them throughout the world, and despite their verbalized eﬀectiveness and
political popularity in e.g. the Danish Flexicurity model, econometricians
have generally failed to estimate large positive programme eﬀects. However,
t h et h r e a te ﬀect, as documented by several studies as well as the present
one, suggests that meetings and programme participation act as a ’tax’ on
unemployed individuals’ leisure time. By taxing away some of the unem-
ployed workers’ time - either directly through the requirement to participate
in programmes, or indirectly by monitoring the individuals’ job search eﬀort
at frequent meetings - the marginal utility of spending time in unemploy-
ment falls, and hence, unemployment spells are shortened due to increased
search activities or lowered reservation wages. The threat eﬀect materializes
the moment the individual realizes that there is a positive risk of having
to attend more meetings and participate in programmes in the future, and
when that risk becomes suﬃciently large, it may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the search
behaviour of the individual.
It thus seems that an intensive labour market policy regime, such as that
which is already in place in Denmark - the experiment is an intensiﬁcation
of a policy regime which was already quite intensive by international stan-
dards - consisting of early monitoring and job search assistance combined
with mandatory programme participation after some elapsed time in unem-
ployment - can reduce average unemployment duration signiﬁcantly, and thus
contributes to alleviating one of the perceived weaknesses of the Flexicurity
model; namely the reduced incentive to conduct job search, which is gener-
ated by the generous unemployment insurance beneﬁts. This conﬁrms the
general impression that active labour market policies constitute an impor-
28tant part of the Flexicurity model, not because they ’ensure the availability
and the qualiﬁcational level of the work force’ (the stated intention in the
law), but rather because they reduce the utility derived from having leisure
as well as generous income transfers.
The Danish Economic Council (2007) has conducted a cost-beneﬁta n a l y -
sis of the intensiﬁcation of the labour market policy regime conducted in the
experiment, using detailed cost information, and calculating as beneﬁts the
r e d u c t i o ni nU Ib e n e ﬁt payments multiplied by the price of providing public
funds (tax distortion) and the increased value of production rsulting from
reduced unemployment duration. They ignore general equilibrium eﬀects,
but ﬁnd nevertheless that the programme has a value to society of €2000
per unemployed individual exposed to the intensive policy regime. This sug-
g e s t st h a ta ne v e nm o r ei n t e n s i v ep r o g r a m m et h a nt h eo n ee m p l o y e di nt h e
Flexicurity model today might be beneﬁcial. However, to arrive at such a
recommendation more forcefully, one would have to investigate likely general
equilibrium eﬀects of such an intensiﬁed regime. This is beyond the scope of
the present paper.
T h ep r e s e n ts t u d yo n l yl o o k sa tt h ee ﬀect of the labour market policy
regime on unemployment duration, but subsequent employment duration
may also be aﬀected. At the moment, we do not have data for employment
duration, since such data come from several other administrative data sets,
which are not available without a considerable time delay. We plan to carry
o u ts u c ha na n a l y s i si nt h ef u t u r e .
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Table 1. Sample selection  
   Storstrøm County  Southern Jutland County  Full sample 
   Treatment     Control Treatment Control   
Total inflow  1313  1374 1229 1264 5180 
Step 1  1306  1371 1226 1252 5155 
Step 2  1293  1360 1219 1240 5112 
Step 3  1283  1347 1206 1225 5061 
Step 4  1174  1219 1055 1065 4513 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
   Storstrøm county 
Southern Jutland 
County 
   Treatment  Control Treatment Control
        
Unemployment 
duration 14.80  16.72 15.63 17.52
Fraction uncensored  0.86  0.82 0.85 0.79
Starting week:       
43, 2005  0.03  0.02 0.05 0.03
44, 2005  0.10  0.09 0.10 0.11
45, 2005  0.03  0.03 0.02 0.04
46, 2005  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.03
47, 2005  0.02  0.03 0.03 0.03
48, 2005  0.06  0.08 0.09 0.09
49, 2005  0.07  0.04 0.04 0.04
50, 2005  0.05  0.04 0.05 0.03
52, 2005  0.11  0.11 0.11 0.11
1, 2006  0.16  0.17 0.15 0.15
2, 2006  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.05
3, 2006  0.04  0.03 0.03 0.04
4, 2006  0.08  0.08 0.06 0.06
5, 2006  0.10  0.11 0.10 0.10
6, 2006  0.03  0.04 0.04 0.03
7, 2006  0.04  0.03 0.01 0.03
8, 2006  0.02  0.03 0.03 0.03
Gender       
Male 0.62  0.60 0.54 0.54
Female 0.38  0.40 0.46 0.46
Age group       
Less than 24  0.09  0.09 0.11 0.13
25-29 0.13  0.12 0.14 0.14
30-39 0.24  0.27 0.26 0.24
40-49 0.26  0.24 0.26 0.25
50-59 0.25  0.25 0.20 0.22
60 and older  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.04
Ethnicity       
Danish 0.92  0.95 0.92 0.93
Western Immigrant  0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03
Non-western 
Immigrant  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
Unemployment Insurance Fund      
Construction workers  0.07  0.07 0.08 0.07
Metal Industry  0.06  0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing 0.42  0.41 0.34 0.36
Technicians 0.03  0.05 0.03 0.03
Trade 0.11  0.11 0.08 0.10
White collar   0.10  0.10 0.10 0.10
Academics 0.03  0.02 0.03 0.03
Others 0.16  0.15 0.22 0.20
Self-employed   0.03  0.04 0.07 0.05
Past Public Income Transfer Rate      
Last year  0.25  0.24 0.23 0.24
1-2 years ago  0.31  0.29 0.30 0.29
2-3 years ago  0.32  0.30 0.32 0.31
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Table 3. Treatment regime effects 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
   Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.
Model 1       
  0.18 0.05  0.20 0.05
        
Model 2       
Weeks 1-2  0.09  0.14  0.10 0.15
Weeks 3-4  0.20  0.13  -0.08 0.15
Weeks 5-9  0.23 0.10  0.36 0.10
Weeks 10-15  0.18 0.10  0.27 0.11
Weeks 16-18  0.38 0.15  0.19 0.16
Weeks 19-22  0.29 0.17  0.09 0.18
Weeks 23-30  -0.08  0.17  0.12 0.17
Weeks 31+  -0.37  0.28  0.39 0.27
Note: Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level, and numbers in italics are statistically significant at 
the 10% level.   36
Table 4. Treatment regime effects and specific treatment effects 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
  Treatments Controls Treatments Controls 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff. Std. Err.
Treatment Group Indicators              
Weeks 1-2  0.07 0.15     0.08  0.15     
Weeks 3-4  0.13 0.15     -0.10  0.15     
Weeks 5-9  0.20 0.12    0.42 0.14    
Weeks 10-15  0.17 0.14     0.38 0.14    
Weeks 16-18  0.45 0.18    0.31 0.20    
Weeks 19-22  0.46 0.20    0.28 0.21    
Weeks 23-30  0.19 0.21    0.31 0.20     
Weeks 31+  -0.01 0.31       0.53  0.31       
              
Specific Treatment Effects              
Meetings              
CV Meeting during past 2 weeks  -0.14 0.13 -0.28 0.17 -0.66 0.16  -0.42 0.18
Job Plan Meeting during past 2 weeks  0.09 0.10 -0.05 0.12 -0.13  0.13  -0.04 0.16
Contact Meeting during past 2 weeks  -0.15 0.25 -0.16 0.30 -0.99 0.47  0.08 0.59
Job Assignment Meting past 2 weeks  -0.17 0.27 0.48 0.27 0.18 0.27  0.49 0.36
Cumulative number of meetings past 4 
weeks 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.00  0.08  -0.06 0.10
In Program Indicators              
JSA -0.02 0.13 -0.10 0.22 -0.66 0.21    
Education  -0.85 0.31 -1.20 0.41 -1.15 0.39  -1.07 0.46
Private Sector Empl. Subs  -1.15 0.38 -0.80 0.55 -1.10 0.90  -1.22 1.17
Public Sector Temp. Job  -0.96 0.34 -0.83 0.72 -1.07 0.36  -1.61 0.75
Vocational Training Program  -0.94 0.43 -0.49 0.48 -0.20 0.26  -1.46 0.84
Completed Program Indicators              
JSA -0.10 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.04  0.11  0.72 1.45
Education -0.13 0.32 -0.20 0.32 0.23  0.29  0.32 0.37
Private Sector Empl. Subs  -1.44 0.97            
Public Sector Temp. Job  -3.88 44.20 0.48 0.92 -0.37  0.65  -0.10 0.71
Vocational Training Program  0.04 0.26 0.24 0.42 0.28 0.22  0.47 0.39
Other Activities              
Assignment Meeting  0.09 0.46 0.75 0.46 0.15 0.56  0.50 0.46
Job Interview  0.59 0.35 0.38 0.34 -0.83 0.62  0.25 0.46
Assignment to Private Agency  -0.08 0.11 -0.09 0.10 -0.21 0.12  -0.25 0.10
Note: Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level, and numbers in italics are statistically significant at 
the 10% level.   37
Table 5.  Treatment regime effects,  and the effect of the activity rate 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
   Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Treatment Group 
Indicators        
Weeks 1-2  0.06  0.14 0.07 0.15
Weeks 3-4  0.08  0.15 -0.08 0.15
Weeks 5-9  0.05  0.13 0.18 0.14
Weeks 10-15  0.03  0.14 -0.03 0.15
Weeks 16-18  0.30  0.18 -0.09 0.21
Weeks 19-22  0.29  0.19 -0.23 0.22
Weeks 23-30  -0.01  0.21 -0.14 0.21
Weeks 31+  -0.18  0.32 0.06 0.31
       
Estimated activity rate  0.44 0.17 1.62 0.25
Note: Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level, and numbers in italics are statistically significant at 
the 10% level. 
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Table 6. Treatment regime effects and the effects of program participation rates and meetings 
intensitites 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Treatment Group Indicators        
Weeks 1-2  0.07 0.14 0.06 0.15
Weeks 3-4  0.10 0.15 -0.08 0.15
Weeks 5-9  0.23 0.21 0.11 0.17
Weeks 10-15  0.08 0.16 -0.21 0.16
Weeks 16-18  0.38 0.20 -0.32 0.22
Weeks 19-22  0.41 0.23 -0.60 0.25
Weeks 22-30  0.16 0.25 -0.44 0.24
Weeks 31+  0.00 0.34 -0.21 0.34
        
Estimated meeting intensity  0.47 0.23 2.30 0.32
Estimated program participation 
rate  -0.51 0.73 1.73 0.66
Note: Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level, and numbers in italics are statistically significant at 





Figure 1. A Duration Timeline for The Social Experiment 
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Note: Shaded lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the survival functions 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Cofficients to background characteristcs in duration Model 1. 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
   Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Starting week:       
43, 2005  0.25  0.22 0.19 0.20
44, 2005  0.05  0.17 0.04 0.17
45, 2005  0.14  0.21 0.03 0.24
46, 2005  0.01  0.22 0.00 0.22
47, 2005  0.19  0.21 -0.05 0.24
48, 2005  0.07  0.18 -0.15 0.18
49, 2005  0.35 0.19 0.00 0.21
50, 2005  0.19  0.19 -0.04 0.20
52, 2005  0.55 0.17 0.45 0.17
1, 2006  0.25  0.16 0.05 0.17
2, 2006  0.70 0.18 0.34 0.19
3, 2006  0.49 0.18 0.34 0.20
4, 2006  1.00 0.17 0.71 0.18
5, 2006  0.23  0.16 0.05 0.17
6, 2006  0.26  0.19 0.11 0.20
7, 2006  0.56 0.19 0.60 0.21
8, 2006             
Gender       
Male  0.40 0.06 0.36 0.06
Female             
Age group       
Less than 24  0.12  0.09 0.25 0.10
25-29 0.11  0.09 0.03 0.09
30-39        
40-49  -0.14 0.07 0.02 0.08
50-59  -0.27 0.07 -0.26 0.08
60 and older  -0.21  0.16 -0.06 0.17
Ethnicity       
Danish        
Western Immigrant  -0.27 0.19 0.05 0.14
Non-western 
Immigrant -0.19  0.13 -0.26 0.15
Unemployment Insurance 
Fund      
Construction workers  0.83 0.10 0.44 0.11
Metal Industry  -0.02  0.11 -0.27 0.12
Manufacturing      
Technicians  -0.30 0.12 -0.05 0.14
Trade  -0.27 0.09 -0.50 0.11
White collar   -0.11  0.09 -0.10 0.10
Academics  -0.43 0.17 -0.18 0.17
Others  -0.52 0.15 -0.56 0.12
Self-employed   -0.18 0.08 -0.27 0.08
Past Public Income Transfer Rate    
Last year  -0.56 0.11 -0.47 0.12
1-2 years ago  -0.02  0.12 0.02 0.12
2-3 years ago  -0.16  0.10 -0.19 0.10
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Table A2. Estimation of the weekly activity rate 
   Storstrøm  Southern Jutland 
   Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
Starting week:       
43, 2005  0.050 0.101 0.183 0.100
44, 2005  0.067 0.083 0.336 0.090
45, 2005  -0.176 0.099 0.127 0.112
46, 2005  -0.002 0.095 0.135 0.110
47, 2005  0.227 0.102 0.376 0.106
48, 2005  0.075 0.086 0.369 0.091
49, 2005  -0.085 0.092 0.576 0.100
50, 2005  -0.254 0.097 0.260 0.104
52, 2005  -0.012 0.085 0.265 0.095
1, 2006  -0.034 0.081 0.314 0.089
2, 2006  -0.009 0.098 -0.068 0.111
3, 2006  0.070 0.102 0.342 0.116
4, 2006  -0.073 0.092 0.385 0.106
5, 2006  0.050 0.084 0.376 0.093
6, 2006  -0.086 0.100 0.263 0.107
7, 2006  -0.184 0.104 -0.163 0.158
8, 2006             
Gender       
Male  -0.067 0.028 0.018 0.031
Female             
Age group       
Less than 24  0.177 0.052 0.217 0.051
25-29  0.077 0.043 0.039 0.044
30-39       
40-49 0.047 0.034 -0.146 0.039
50-59  0.145 0.034 -0.067 0.040
60 and older  -0.002 0.068 -0.081 0.085
Ethnicity            
Danish       
Western Immigrant  0.073 0.076 0.052 0.073
Non-western Immigrant  0.194 0.051 0.169 0.060
Unemployment Insurance Fund             
Construction workers  0.206 0.069 0.001 0.077
Metal Industry  0.045 0.062 -0.026 0.073
Manufacturing       
Technicians  0.314 0.062 0.139 0.086
Trade  -0.148 0.040 -0.010 0.048
White collar   0.045 0.042 -0.259 0.051
Academics -0.080 0.074 0.443 0.079
Others -0.097 0.062 0.073 0.055
Self-employed   -0.102 0.036 0.040 0.038
Past Public Income Transfer 
Rate            
Last year  0.082 0.048 0.251 0.050
1-2 years ago  -0.190 0.052 0.145 0.058
2-3 years ago  0.000 0.044 -0.069 0.049
Treatment Group Indicators            
Weeks 1-2  0.117 0.072 0.287 0.231
Weeks 3-4  0.753 0.071 -0.048 0.071
Weeks 5-9  1.956 0.054 0.962 0.061
Weeks 10-15  1.752 0.057 1.513 0.063
Weeks 16-18  1.305 0.086 1.322 0.097  50
Weeks 19-22  1.323 0.083 1.663 0.092
Weeks 22-30  1.238 0.068 1.217 0.071
Weeks 31+  0.851 0.077 1.301 0.081
Note: The parameters shown are log odds ratios. The duration parameters are not shown in the table, but are available 
on request. Numbers in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level, and numbers in italics are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
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